The Second Battle of Cheonpyeong Valley, held on August 21, 1950, is known to the US forces as the Battle of Bowling Alley. It was the battle that turned the tide of the Battle of Tabu-dong. As one of the battles in the Tabu-dong area fought by the ROK 1st Division and the US 25th Division against the North Korean 13th Division, it was the first joint Korean-American operation and the first tank battle, and it holds significant meaning.
Background
Deployment of Forces
On August 17, 1950, Lieutenant General Walker, commander of the US Eighth Army, confirmed that the situation of the ROK 1st Division was extremely critical. He reinforced the 1st Division with the 27th Regiment of the US 25th Division (regimental commander Colonel Mycaleris). On the 19th, he deployed the 23rd Regiment of the US 2nd Division (regimental commander Colonel Freeman), which was short one battalion, immediately behind the main line of resistance of the 1st Division.
On the same day, the Army Headquarters also attached the 10th Regiment of the 8th Division to the 1st Division, thereby strengthening the combat power of the division. Around this time, three North Korean divisions, the 3rd, 13th, and 15th, were preparing to attack in front of the 1st Division. Had the many reinforcements not been committed to the 1st Division, the collapse of the Tabu-dong defensive position would have been only a matter of time. In particular, along the approach route from Sinjumak to Tabu-dong, a North Korean tank regiment that had received resupply of 14 tanks, the largest number, had completed its attack preparations and was waiting for an opportunity.
Colonel Mycaleris, commander of the US 27th Regiment, visited the 1st Division headquarters, explained the mission assigned to him, and coordinated with the division on joint operations. The US 27th Regiment was neither attached to nor placed under the operational control of the 1st Division. However, because US forces were deployed and operated within a ROK division's defensive sector for the first time in history, it held significant meaning as the origin of joint Korean-American operations.
On the afternoon of August 17, the commander of the US 27th Regiment personally toured the area from Jinmokjeong to Soyi-ri, reconnoitered the terrain, and established the regimental combat command post at Samhak-dong. At this time, soldiers of the ROK 11th Regiment were moved by the sight of the American regimental commander, accompanied by only one signalman, advancing to the point where bullets crossed on the front line to observe the enemy situation.
Construction of Defensive Positions
On the next day, August 18, at 13:00, the US 27th Regiment advanced to a point 400 to 500 meters north of Soyi-ri. It deployed the 1st Battalion on the left of Route 5 and the 2nd Battalion on its right, while the 3rd Battalion, held in reserve, occupied Hill 466 at Ugye-san. The tank company placed two tanks each at the front road and along the stream, and kept four tanks in reserve behind them. Six 3.5-inch rocket launchers were also prepared as firing positions along the road and the stream. In this way, the defensive positions for anti-tank defense were completed.
The 1st Battalion of the ROK 1st Division's 11th Regiment, after taking over the Bokgok defensive sector, the valley floor between Sinjumak and Tabu-dong, from the Americans, advanced to a ridge line 400 to 500 meters high extending north from Wibong-gol. The 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment held the area around Hill 356 at Gasan.
Course of the Battle
Preliminary Engagements
On the evening of August 18, North Korean forces attempted a combined tank and infantry attack that included five tanks. Unaware at all that US forces had been deployed along the Tabu-dong approach route, the North Koreans advanced while firing. Before long, two enemy tanks approached within the defensive position of Company F of the US 27th Regiment. When one of them was struck by a 3.5-inch rocket round and burst into flames, the crew of the other abandoned its tank and fled. The three enemy tanks that followed were also driven back by intense American artillery fire. Two hours later, the enemy attacked again but was repulsed by American barrage fire.
However, in the early morning of August 18, mortar rounds fired by some enemy troops that had infiltrated from Gasan fell near Daegu Station, and the crisis in Daegu grew even more acute. As a result of this attack, the government moved to Busan that day and an evacuation order was issued, throwing Daegu into complete chaos. However, Cho Byung-ok, Minister of Home Affairs, went into the streets with the police, rescinded the evacuation order, and barely managed to stabilize public sentiment.
The next day, August 19, passed in relative calm. On the daytime of August 20, UN air forces carried out large-scale air bombardment. However, because forward air controllers who guide fighter aircraft had not been dispatched to the battalions of the 11th Regiment, friendly forces on Hill 674 suffered heavy casualties from friendly fire. Because bombing also hit the area around Hill 448, the 1st Battalion of the 11th Regiment deployed there withdrew to Jinmokjeong, and that evening it moved back to the hill.
Then, at about 17:00 on August 20, enemy artillery shells fell along the Tabu-dong approach route, and enemy tanks followed, advancing secretly together with infantry. At this time, the Americans held their fire until the enemy reached the minefield and began clearing mines, and then drove the enemy back with barrage fire. That night, between 02:00 and 03:00, a North Korean force of about one battalion approached. Friendly forces lured them forward to within 50 meters, then delivered a surprise fire attack and formed a killing zone with hand grenades to annihilate them.
Battle of the Bowling Alley
On the morning of August 21, the 1st Battalion of the 11th Regiment seized Hill 356 on the left of Route 5 and established its positions. With this, together with Hill 356, where the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment was deployed on the left of the Tabu-dong approach route, friendly forces gained control of the dominant heights on both sides of the Tabu-dong approach route.
That night, the first tank battle of the Korean War unfolded in the Cheonpyeong Valley of Tabu-dong. The enemy, with tanks and self-propelled guns in front, launched a large-scale night counterattack, directing a diversionary attack against the 11th Regiment and the main attack against the front of the US 27th Regiment. As they had apparently anticipated, they seemed to seek a decisive battle and began a large-scale night offensive.
Along the ridges on both sides of the Sinjumak-Tabu-dong approach route, about one battalion of North Korean troops each was secretly approaching, and a North Korean combined tank and infantry force was attacking along Route 5. The US 27th Regiment received reports of enemy approach from Company C, deployed at the front of the defensive position, and immediately fired illumination flares. The North Koreans advanced firing with seven tanks and three self-propelled guns, followed by 19 vehicles and infantry dispersed on both sides of the road.
The Americans concentrated all available firepower to separate the North Korean infantry from their tanks. American tanks also fired their guns at a range of about 200 meters and destroyed one enemy tank, while another enemy tank fell into an anti-tank ditch installed in front of the position. After the lead tank group was destroyed, the tanks and self-propelled guns that followed stopped and began firing on friendly positions. Thus, for the first time since the war began, a tank-versus-tank firefight took place.
In the narrow valley of the Tabu-dong approach route, armor-piercing rounds fired from the tank guns of both sides lit up the night sky with sparks for five hours, and their roar shook the mountains and fields. Soldiers of Company F, who were watching this scene from the middle of the Tabu-dong approach route, saw the clusters of tank shells crossing each other and were reminded of bowling balls rolling down a lane, so they named the tank battle of that night the "Bowling Alley" battle.
On the next day, August 22, after daybreak, an American reconnaissance patrol confirmed 9 enemy tanks and 4 self-propelled guns destroyed at the front, along with several vehicles and more than 1,300 bodies, and captured 11 prisoners. From this, it was judged that the enemy, which had been advancing on Tabu-dong with the aim of Daegu, had lost 75 percent of its strength, and the remainder had barely withdrawn.
Meanwhile, the North Korean forces approaching along the left and right ridgelines on both sides of the Tabu-dong approach route did not concentrate their combat power and committed platoon-sized units piecemeal, and in the end they were annihilated in front of friendly defensive positions.
From August 25, as the crisis on the Tabu-dong front disappeared, Lieutenant General Walker, commander of the US Eighth Army, released the US 27th Regiment from its mission of reinforcing the ROK 1st Division. Accordingly, at 03:45 on the 26th, the 11th Regiment took over the defensive sector of the US 27th Regiment. With this, the US 27th Regiment, after eight days of hard fighting, departed at 08:00 on August 31, with its personnel by train and its vehicles by road, and by 20:30 that night on the 31st had completed its move to Masan, where the headquarters of the US 25th Division was located.
Meanwhile, the US Eighth Army belatedly learned that the North Korean 15th Division, which had been directed at the Tabu-dong front, had moved to the Yeongcheon area between August 20 and 21. On the night of August 20, the North Koreans judged that they could no longer break through the Tabu-dong front, so they moved the North Korean 15th Division deployed in the Yuhak-san area toward Uiseong and ordered it to attack toward Yeoncheon, in front of the ROK 8th Division. As a result, part of the North Korean 3rd Division took responsibility for the Suam-san area, and the 13th Division for the right flank of Yuhak-san, and their attacking power was greatly weakened.
Results
In the Cheonpyeong Valley battle, which was conducted from August 18 to 25, the confirmed North Korean losses included 13 T-34 tanks, 5 SU-76 self-propelled guns, and 23 trucks. The units of the North Korean 13th Division suffered serious casualties during the battle, estimated at 3,000 dead, wounded, and captured. The division withdrew to rebuild. From August 12 to 25, the total North Korean casualties were 5,690.
American losses during the battle were very light. This was exceptional in that battle, since other UN forces, when applying similar pressure to the Korean People's Army in offensive operations at that time, paid a heavy price. American infantry suffered 5 killed and 54 wounded in the 27th Regiment, and 3 killed and 16 wounded in the 23rd Regiment. As a result, total American casualties were 8 killed and 70 wounded. Korean forces suffered far more during the battle. About 2,300 soldiers died in the battle: 2,244 men and 56 officers. However, these losses were not severe because volunteers poured in from the surrounding countryside to fight for Korea.
References
Ministry of National Defense, <<History of the Korean War>>, 1970